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Duquesne Law Review
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS-SEX Dis-
CRIMINATION-SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION-In a plurality opinion, the
United States Supreme Court has held that classifications based on sex
violate due process guarantees where female, and not male, members
of the armed services are required to prove dependency of their spouses
as a condition for receiving benefits.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
Appellants Sharron Frontiero, an Air Force officer, and her husband,
Joseph Frontiero, sought increased quarters allowance and medical
and dental benefits under federal statutes.' While Sharron Frontiero
could claim her husband as a "dependent" for the purpose of obtaining
increased benefits only if he were in fact dependent upon her for over
one-half of his support,2 a male officer, may claim his wife as a depend-
ent without showing actual dependency.3 Joseph Frontiero's living
expenses were $354.00 per month, and he received $205.00 per month
in veteran's benefits; since he was not dependent on Lt. Frontiero for
more than one-half of his support, her requests for increased allowances
were denied.
The Frontieros sought a permanent injunction in federal district
court against the enforcement of the provisions. A three-judge court,
applying a traditional equal protection standard, 4 found the provisions
constitutional 5 and nonviolative of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. 6 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction7 and
1. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1076 (1970) (medical and dental benefits); 37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403
(1970) (quarters allowance). These statutes cover the uniformed services, defined as the
armed forces, the Environmental Services Administration and the Public Health Service.
2. 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2)(C) (1970); 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) (both provisions define husband
as a dependent for purposes of the statutes).
3. 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2)(A) (1970); 37 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1970) (both provisions include wife
as a dependent for purposes of the statutes).
4. Under a traditional equal protection standard, a statute which does not involve a
fundamental right or a suspect classification must be upheld ". . . if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it .... " Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201, 206-
07 (M.D. Ala. 1972), citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); or unless it is
patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.
See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961).
5. 341 F. Supp. at 201.
6. Although the fifth amendment due process clause does not expressly contain an equal
protection guarantee, it does prohibit discrimination which violates due process. See
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969); Boiling v. Sharpe, 374 U.S. 497 (1954).
7. 409 U.S. 840 (1972).
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reversed," four justices joining in the court's opinion, four concurring
in the judgment and one justice dissenting.
Justice Brennan, speaking for a plurality,9 adopted appellants' con-
tention that classifications based on sex, like classifications based on
race,10 alienage, 1 and national origin' 2 are inherently suspect and
therefore subject to strict judicial scrutiny.13 Justice Brennan based his
decision to use a stricter standard on Reed v. Reed,'4 in finding justifica-
tion for Reed's departure from traditional equal protection analysis in
the similarities between sex and race (a suspect classification),"5 and in
Congressional legislation sensitive to sex-based classifications.' 6 Having
determined that the classification was based solely on sex' 7 and that
strict scrutiny was the applicable standard, the Court examined the
facts in Frontiero and found that the classification violated the due
process clause.
The lower court concluded, and the government contended, that
Congress might reasonably have based its classification scheme on the
8. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1975).
9. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Douglas, White and Marshall.
10. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1823).
11. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 US. 365, 372 (1971).
12. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948).
13. A suspect classification is one means by which the stricter standard may be trig-
gered; classifications involving a fundamental right are also afforded the benefit of a stricter
standard. The result of such an application is that the proponent of the statute must
show a compelling state interest. See generally Comment, Developments in the Law-
Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1067-1192 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments],
for a discussion and comparison of the traditional and strict standards.
14. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
15. 411 U.S. at 685. See Comment, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We
Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1499, 1507 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Sex Discrimination], where the author points out:
The similarities between race and sex are striking. Both classifications create large,
natural classes, membership of which is beyond the individual's control; both are
highly visible characteristics on which legislators find it easy to draw gross, stereotypi-
cal distinctions. Historically, the legal position of black slaves was justified by analogy
to the legal status of women.
In Developments, supra note 13 at 1173, it is noted that:
What is apparently suspect about the use of such [sex-based] characteristics is that
on their face they bear no relation to one's ability to perform or contribute to society.
16. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a),(b),(c) (1970),
provides that organizations subject to the Act cannot discriminate on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1970), no employer covered by the Act can discriminate between employees on the basis
of sex. The Equal Rights Aniendment, passed by Congress on March 22, 1972, and sub-
mitted to the legislatures of the staftes for ratification, S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118
CONG. REc. 4612 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1972), reads:
Section 1. Equality of Rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.
17. 411 U.S. at 688. The lower court opinion, which Justice Rehnquist cites as the
basis for his dissent, did not agree with appellants that the sole basis for the classification
was sex. 341 F. Supp. at 205-06.
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premise that wives are generally dependent on their husbands in our
society and that it "would be more economical to require married
female members claiming husbands to prove actual dependency than
to extend the presumption of dependency afforded males to such
members.""' The government, however, offered no concrete evidence
to prove that the presumption of dependency of wives worked more
savings than granting benefits only to those males who demonstrated
their wives' dependency by supplying affidavits. The Court noted the
low cost of this procedure and evidence that, if put to the test, many
wives would actually fail to qualify for the benefits.19 Although the
proffered purpose, administrative efficiency, is not without some im-
portance, the Constitution recognizes higher values, especially when
strict scrutiny is the standard to be met. Any scheme which draws a
line between the sexes solely for this purpose involves "the very kind
of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the [Constitution]. ' 20
In basing its decision on Reed v. Reed,2 ' the Court found implicit
support for its approaches. Both Justice Brennan in his opinion, and
the concurring opinion of Justice Powell, seem to view Reed as a de-
parture from the traditional equal protection analysis. The real ques-
tion in Frontiero involved the extent to which Reed represents a rejec-
tion of the "traditional" or "rational basis" test as applied to sex-based
classifications; it is this question which divided the court. In Reed, the
Court examined a state statute providing for the appointment of estate
administrators which gave a mandatory preference to males over fe-
males.22 The Court held that the statute violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment when individuals of different sexes
were otherwise equally qualified to serve in that capacity.23
In analyzing the approach taken in Reed, the plurality in Frontiero
noted that "traditional" equal protection analysis was not followed.24
Although administrative efficiency was considered as being "not with-
out some legitimacy,"2 5 the Court in Reed did not accept the conten-
18. 341 F. Supp. at 207.
19. 411 U.S. at 689 n.23.
20. Id. at 690.
21. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
22. IDAHo CODE § 15-312 (1948) (father and mother are given the same priority to ad-
minister an estate); id. § 15-314 (gives a preference to males over females where persons
are equally entitled to administer an estate).
23. 404 U.S. at 77.
24. 411 U.S. at 683. Justice Rehnquist, who dissented for the reasons stated in the
district court opinion, would apparently support the "traditional" test.
25. 404 U.S. at 76.
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tion that a mandatory preference for males over females was a reason-
able means to reduce the administrative workload by obviating the
necessity of examining individual applicants. Nor did the plurality ac-
cept the preference as reasonable because men generally have more ex-
perience in business affairs than do women.26 Those members of the
Frontiero Court who joined Justice Brennan saw in Reed something
more than the relaxation of the traditional standard of equal protec-
tion. The opinion points to language in Reed which states that dissimi-
lar treatment for persons similarly situated results in the "very kind of
arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the [Constitution]." 27 This
language suggests a sensitivity to sex-based classifications which may be
viewed as foreshadowing the plurality strict scrutiny approach in
Frontiero.28
It might thus be argued that the extension was predictable. Al-
though the Court has recently refused to expand the categories of
"fundamental rights" and "suspect classification, '29 it showed no hesi-
tation in using the revitalized traditional equal protection standard in
an area (decedents' estates) into which it has little occasion to venture.8 0
The nature of the rights involved might also have played a part in
Reed's refusal to venture into strict scrutiny. In the area of estate ad-
ministration, the interest of a personal representative is necessarily
limited in scope and duration. In Frontiero, on the other hand, the
right involved was a continuing benefit dispersed by the government
and incidental to employment.
Justice Powell, in his concuring opinion,31 mentions two factors
responsible for his refusal to hold that sex is a suspect classification.
First, he states that Reed did not add sex to the group of classifications
which were suspect, and that the case should be decided on the au-
thority of Reed, reserving for the future any expansion of its rationale.
26. Brief for Appellee at 12, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). While the Reed Court did not discuss
this specific justification for the statute, the Court in Frontiero seems to view appellee's
argument as a basis for the Reed decision. 411 U.S. at 683 nn.10 & 11.
27. 411 U.S. at 690, citing 404 U.S. at 76.
28. Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 34 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
29. Id. at 12-15.
30. Id. at 32-33.
31. The Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun joined Justice Powell. Justice Stewart con-
curred separately,
agreeing that the statutes before us work an invidious discrimination in violation of
the Constitution. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225.
411 U.S. at 691.
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Generally, the Court will choose the narrowest possible ground for
decision as an expression of its policy of self-limitation. 32 The rationale
for this policy is to restrict the degree of interference with the actions
of other branches of government.81 A comparison of Reed and Frontiero
suggests that Reed can be interpreted as providing a narrower ground
for decision. Justice Powell, however, does not give us further insight
into what test he believes was applied in that case. One commentator
has suggested that the Court seems to have tentatively reached a middle
ground between the extremes of the two-tiered system.3 4 This "new" test
employs the language of the traditional equal protection analysis but
reaches a result which is inconsistent with the extreme deference to
the legislature that the "rational basis" test traditionally employed.
85
This approach is characterized by an inquiry into the means used
to further legislative purposes. If the Court can invalidate the legisla-
tion because the means do not have a substantial relation to the end
sought to be achieved, the Court need never inquire into the legitimacy
of the end itself. For example, the Court in Frontiero could look to the
means used to effectuate the end (the statutory scheme) and decide if
it has a reasonable relation to the end sought to be achieved (here, in-
creased efficiency). Justice Powell could find that no reasonable relation
existed, thereby obviating the need to examine administrative effi-
ciency to determine its value as a governmental purpose.3 6 In other
words, the concurring opinion can be viewed as implicitly espousing
this "newer" equal protection analysis.3 7 If so, it would explain Justice
Powell's "narrow ground" language.
If the decision is viewed through the plurality opinion, the "narrow
ground" criticism loses its force. Since the plurality sees Reed as a
foreshadowing of the application of the standard in Frontiero, the
distinction between the two cases would be a matter of degree, and
32. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
33. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1773,
1803-06 [hereinafter cited as Dershowitz].
34. See generally Gunther note 28 supra. For other decisions which can be characterized
as employing this test, see id. at 11 n.48.
35. Id. at 19.
36. Administrative efficiency as a legitimate legislative purpose has been called into
question by the Court. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). The relatively little weight which the Court seems to put on ad-
ministrative efficiency may in part account for its decisions invalidating sex-based classifi-
cations.
37. For purposes of this note, "new" equal protection refers to the two-tiered system
developed under the Warren Court, while "newer" equal protection is used to describe the
Burger Court's developing standard.
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Reed could be seen as generating a broader principle which is to be
explicitly applied later.8s
Justice Powell's second point was that, in enunciating a strict stand-
ard, the Court pre-empted a major political decision which will be
resolved by the states' ratification or rejection of the equal rights
amendment. Once again, the purpose of the doctrine of judicial re-
straint is a desire not to interfere with other branches of government.
The question which must be asked is whether that purpose would be
furthered by deciding not to apply strict scrutiny.
First, it must be recognized that the nature of a "pending" amend-
ment is unique. Unlike legislation, an amendment has no force until
ratified by the requisite number of states subsequent to its passage by
Congress. In this sense, ratification is the ultimate manifestation of the
will of the people. In Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery,89
the issue was whether a privately owned cemetery could defend a suit
for breach of contract on the ground that the decedent was a Winne-
bago Indian and the contract restricted burial privileges to Caucasians.
The Supreme Court found that there was a statute which prohibited
cemeteries from discriminating, and it dismissed the writ of certiorari
even though that statute excepted cases involved in pending litigation
and, for that reason, did not apply to the case. The Court reasoned that
the case "would have assumed such an isolated significance that it would
hardly have been brought here in the first instance. '40
The equal rights amendment is in a somewhat different position.
Its passage is hardly assured; in no way can adjudication be considered
of isolated significance where it touches on subjects which would come
under the purview of the amendment. Consideration of a proposed
constitutional amendment which may or may not be ratified in an
indeterminate number of years should not be controlling where social
needs are pressing and an issue is properly presented under existing
law. Legislation passed by Congress41 demonstrates that changes are
being sought in the area of sexual discrimination and that there is an
increased sensitivity to sex-based classifications. In such a situation the
Court should perhaps consider balancing the virtues of judicial re-
38. Cf. Dershowitz, supra note 33, at 1804-05.
39. 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
40. Id. at 76-77.
41. See discussion in note 16 supra
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straint against the danger that the Court may become irrelevant as an
institution to pressing social issues. 42
Secondly, there seems to be a presumption that the application of
strict scrutiny would moot the equal rights amendment. The amend-
ment, however, has been viewed as broader in its possible effect than
the standard of strict scrutiny as applied to suspect classifications. 43 In
fact, it has been suggested that the amendment is needed because the
strict scrutiny standard, even if adopted, would not be adequate to
protect persons from sex-based classifications. 44
Under the strict scrutiny equal protection analysis the state can de-
fend a classification by showing a "compelling interest" in the dis-
crimination. Since the determination essentially calls for a value judg-
ment in regard to the legislative purpose, "compelling interest" is a
slippery term which changes with the views of the court which applies
it.4 5 While the judicial qualifications which may be read into the equal
rights amendment are as yet only a matter of speculation, it is con-
ceivable that classifications which could survive equal protection attack
might not fare so well under the equal rights amendment.46 Further,
the application of strict scrutiny could have beneficial effects. It would
give notice that justifications for sex discrimination were rejected and
that a national commitment to sexual equality will be given greater
weight by the courts in the future. 47 The "newer" equal protection
cannot serve this function, whether or not it invalidates sex-based
classifications, as long as the strict scrutiny standard is still applied to
other groups. Moreover, attempts to apply the "newer" standard may
cause considerable confusion. 48
Frontiero, by virtue of its plurality, holds no more than did Reed.
42. See THE DEFENSES OF FREEDOM, THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG 150
(D. Moynihan ed. 1966).
43. Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitu-
tional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 884-85 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Brown]; Sex Discrimination, supra note 15, at 1519; contra, Gelman, The Emerging Con-
stitutional Principle of Sexual Equality, 1972 SuP. CT. REv. 157, 166-73 [hereinafter cited as
Gelman].
44. Brown, supra note 43, at 880.
45. See Gunther, supra note 28, at 21; Sex Discrimination, supra note 39, at 1509-16, for
the view that strict scrutiny would involve a balancing test which itself would create prob-
lems in dealing with sex-based classifications.
46. Brown, supra note 43, at 904.
47. Gelman, supra note 43, at 165.
48. See, e.g., Borass v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
414 U.S. 907 (1973). See Comment, Fundamental Personal Rights: Another Approach to
Equal Protection, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 807, 819-22 (1973), for the view that, as applied in
Borass, the "newer" approach was equivalent to the strict scrutiny approach.
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Its reasoning, however, has informed us that four members of the Court
are willing to expand the category of "suspect classification" to include
sex. While the Court's future action is uncertain, increasing pressure
on the judiciary to deal more effectively with sex-based classifications
may induce the Court to adopt strict scrutiny as its standard in dealing
with sex discrimination.
Janice M. Holder
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF THE LOCAL PROPERTY TAX FOR
FINANCING EDUCATION-The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that
the local property tax system of financing education does not afford
students the level of education mandated by the state constitution be-
cause it does not guarantee each student an adequate education.
Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
This action was brought by residents, taxpayers, and various municipal
officials, challenging the constitutionality of the New Jersey system of
financing public education.1 The New Jersey Superior Court deter-
mined that the use of the local property tax system for financing educa-
tion discriminated against taxpayers and those students living in dis-
tricts with low property ratables by imposing on them unequal tax bur-
dens. Taxpayers living in different school districts were paying taxes
at different rates in order to finance their school systems. The superior
court held that the discrimination violated the equal protection provi-
sions of the federal and state constitutions.2 The superior court also
held that the system violated state constitutional provisions related to
education and the assessment of real property for taxation." The de-
fendants appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
The New Jersey system of educational financing derives its funds
from three major sources. The principle portion, 67 per cent of the
state-wide total operating expenditures, is raised through the local ad
valorem taxation of real property.4 State financial aid which consists
1. Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A2d 187 (L. Div. 1972), rev'd, 62 N.J.
473. 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
2. 118 N.J. Super. at 275, 287 A.2d at 214.
3. Id. at 277, 287 A.2d at 215.
4. Id. at 229, 287 A.2d at 190.
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